



# Gaza nach dem 7. Oktober

# Ablauf

Der 7. Oktober und seine Folgen

Gaza vor dem 7. Oktober

Zur Lage in Gaza



# 7. Oktober 2023



Ruine im Kibbutz Be'eri nach dem 7. Oktober.

Quelle: Kobi Gideon / Government Press Office of Israel, CC BY-SA 3.0

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Ca. 1.140 Menschen von Hamas u. a. getötet: rund 700 israel. Zivilpersonen (inkl. 36 Kinder), ca. 370 Angehörige bewaffneter Kräfte, ca. 70 ausländ. Staatsangehörige

251 Personen entführt (ca. noch 100 in Gaza, davon mind. 35 tot)

Weitverbreitete Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gg. die Menschlichkeit

Zeitweilig bis zu ca. 150.000 Menschen binnenvertrieben (davon 90.000 im N)

Quelle: u. a. HRC, Col: Detailed findings on attacks carried out on and after 7 October 2023 in Israel.

<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-crp-3.pdf>

# 7. Oktober 2023



Versagen von Geheimdiensten und israel. Armee

Mythos der Unangreifbarkeit schwer erschüttert

Entsprechende psychosoziale Folgen in einer Gesellschaft, in der das kollektive Trauma der Shoah eine zentrale Rolle spielt

IDI-Umfrage 12.-15. Februar:

68% jüd. Befragter in Israel gg. hum. Hilfe für Gaza

55% gegen Verhandlungslösung

Quelle: Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/52976>

# 7. Oktober 2023



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IDI-Umfrage 1.-6. Mai:  
Rafah-Offensive o. Geisel-Deal?

56% der jüd. Befragten in Israel  
für Geisel-Deal (88,5% der  
Palästinenser in Israel)

37% jüd. Befragter für Rafah-  
Offensive

Auch: Umfrage Pew Institute zu  
Zensur in sozialen Medien

Quelle: Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), <https://en.idi.org.il/press-releases/53959>

Pew Research Center, <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/08/26/many-israelis-say-social-media-content-about-the-israel-hamas-war-should-be-censored/>

# Israelische Reaktion

Militär. Angriffe auf Ziele in Gaza bereits am 07.10. und direkt 2 Wochen vollständige Abriegelung

Offizielle Kriegsziele: Vernichtung der Hamas, Befreiung der Geiseln

Nicht offizielle, aber geäußerte Ziele: Rache, Bestrafung der Bevölkerung, „absoluter Sieg“, Verkleinerung Gazas, „Verringerung“ der Bevölkerung durch Vertreibung (euphemistisch: „voluntary transfer“), begleitet von (genozidaler) Hassrede



Ruine des Physiotherapiezentrum der PMRS im Norden Gazas.  
Quelle: PMRS

# Gaza vor dem 7. Oktober

Seit Ende der 1990er Jahre zunehmende **Abkapselung** der Enklave durch Israel

500.000 „**Grenzübertritte**“ pro Monat im Jahr 2000  
Rund 58.000 im August 2023

Seit 2007 (Kollaps der Regierung der nationalen Einheit) fast vollständige **Abriegelung**

Zunahme der **Armut** auch infolge der Lohnkürzungen durch die PA (bis zu 70%)



Palästinensischer Mann in Khuza'a, Gazastreifen vor den Ruinen seines Hauses, 2014.  
Photo: Lazar Simeonov

# Humanitäre Situation vor dem 7.10.

Wasser-, Strom-, Finanz- und Umweltkrise

50% der Bevölkerung unter 15 Jahre

Arbeitslosigkeit bei ca. 45%

71.000 fehlende Wohnungen

80% erhielten humanitäre Hilfe

Erwartete Verdopplung der Bevölkerung in 30 Jahren



Protestcamp in Gaza beim Großen Marsch der Rückkehr. Photo: Culture & Free Thought Association, Khan Younis



# Gaza im Krieg

Bis zu 70% d. ca. 44.000 Toten:  
Frauen, Kinder, Jugendliche

Über 104.000 Menschen  
verletzt (über 10.000 vermisst)

Vertreibung von mehr als 80%  
der Bevölkerung (Order zu  
Zwangsevakuierung gg. 86%  
aktiv)

Gesundheitswesen kollabiert,  
kein einziges Krankenhaus  
mehr voll funktionsfähig



Gaza. Photo: Mohammed Zaanoun, active stills



# أعلان هام



الى كل المتواجدين في مدينة غزة،

الممرات آمنة تمكنكم المرور **بسرعة وبدون تفتيش** من مدينة غزة الى المآوي في دير البلح والزوايدة.  
نعلنكم، بأن شوارع طارق بن زياد وعمر المختار تعتبر **ممرات آمنة** للعبور غربا الى شارع الرشيد (البحر) ومن هناك جنوبا.  
شوارع الوحدة وخليل الوزير تعتبر **ممرات آمنة** للعبور شرقا الى حي الزيتون ودوار المدينة، ومن هناك الى شارع صلاح الدين جنوبا.  
**مدينة غزة سوف تبقى منطقة قتال خطيرة!**

جيش الدفاع الإسرائيلي



# Gaza im Krieg

Viel Desinformation über die Nutzung von Schulen, Gesundheitseinrichtungen etc.

Bsp. Al Shifa Krankenhaus, Angriffe auf WCK Convoi, Tunnel von Rafah nach Ägypten etc.

Zahlreiche Übergriffe u. Angriffe auf Krankenhäuser, Ambulanzen, u. Gesundheitszentren

Unzweifelhaft: flächendeckende Zerstörung ziviler Infrastruktur



Zeltstadt im Süden Gazas. Photo: Mohammed Zaanoun, active stills

# Rafah im November 2023



# Rafah im September 2024




# Rafah vorher und nachher



# oPt Emergency Situation Update

Issue 51

 7 Oct 2023 - 20 Nov 2024



World Health Organization

occupied Palestinian territory



**784** Fatalities



**6,642** Injuries



**653** Health Attacks As of 20 Nov 2024



**25** People killed in attacks



**120** People injured in attacks



**58** Health facilities affected




Including

**20** Mobile clinics



**463** Ambulances affected



# oPt Emergency Situation Update

Issue 51



7 Oct 2023 - 20 Nov 2024



World Health Organization

occupied Palestinian territory

## West Bank, including east Jerusalem

## Overview As of 16 Nov 2024

Source: Ministry of Health.



**784** Fatalities



**6,642** Injuries



## **653** Health Attacks As of 20 Nov 2024



**25** People killed in attacks



**120** People injured in attacks



**58** Health facilities affected




Including

**20** Mobile clinics



**463** Ambulances affected





# oPt Emergency Situation Update

Issue 51



7 Oct 2023 - 20 Nov 2024



World Health  
Organization

occupied Palestinian  
territory

## Gaza Strip

### Overview As of 20 Nov 2024

Source: Ministry of Health.



**568 Health Attacks** As of 20 Nov 2024



**846** People killed in attacks



**1,237** People injured in attacks



**122** Health facilities affected  
**Including 33** Hospitals damaged



**145** Ambulances affected

The results of this analysis suggest a repeated and consistent pattern of attacks on hospitals across the region, defined by


attacks on surroundings ○

direct targeting ○

siege ○

occupation ○

These cumulatively forced the hospitals **out of service** ✕



# Gaza im Krieg

Grassierende Infektionen: Durchfall, Atemwegs-, Hautkrankheiten

Akuter Wassermangel (1 israel. Pipeline lieferte zu 47%, 83% Grundwasserquellen funktionieren nicht, Entsalzungs- u. Kläranlagen außer Betrieb)

Im Juli: nur 25% des benötigten Treibstoffs, dadurch 40% Absenkung der öffentlichen Wasserversorgung


Verfall der öffentlichen Ordnung durch Verknappung

Quellen: GAZA STRIP: IPC Acute Food Insecurity, Nov. 2023-Feb. 2024

[https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Gaza\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Nov2023\\_Feb2024.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Nov2023_Feb2024.pdf)

UN OCHA Flash Update #123, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel

<https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-123>



# Land- wirtschaft



Lt. UNOSAT 68% der  
landwirtschaftl. Flächen  
in Gaza zerstört

Vor dem 7.10. produ-  
zierte Gaza Nahrung

Kein zuverlässiger oder  
gar sicherer Zugang zu  
den verbliebenen  
Flächen, also kaum  
mehr Produktion



Quelle: Planet Labs PBC | (LEFT) Before: June 2023; (RIGHT) After: May 2024





# Landwirtschaft

Quelle: UNOSAT FAO Gaza Strip Cropland Damage Analysis, 29 Sept. 2024. <https://unosat.org/products/3985>

Current: May 2024 - Jun 2024

Projected: Jun 2024 - Sep 2024

Projected: Jun 2024 - Sep 2024



Phase	Population	%
Phase 1	0	0
Phase 2	97,573	4
Phase 3	913,156	41
Phase 4	745,437	33
Phase 5	495,291	22

Population P3+	%
2,153,884	96

- Download map image
- Download population
- Download GIS format

Quellen: IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification: Gaza Strip. Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 1 May - 15 June and Projection for 16 June - 30 September 2024 [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Gaza\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insecurity\\_Nov2023\\_Feb2024.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Nov2023_Feb2024.pdf)

# Hungersnot oder nicht?

## Israel weist UN-Bericht zu drohender Hungersnot im Gazastreifen als „irreführend“ zurück

Stand: 28.06.2024 | Lesedauer: 2 Minuten





© dpa/Mohammed Talatene

## Experten korrigieren sich selbst Doch keine Hungersnot in Gaza


Im März warnten Experten, eine Hungersnot stehe unmittelbar bevor. Nun räumten sie ein, dass diese nicht ausgebrochen ist. Ein hohes Risiko bestehe dennoch.



## Diagram 5: Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table for Household Group Classification

*Purpose: To guide short-term strategic objectives tailored to the needs of household groups with relatively similar Phase classifications, which should compliment medium- and long-term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.*

*Usage: Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.*

	Phase 1 None	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe
Phase Name and Description	<p>HH group is able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.</p>	<p>Even with any humanitarian assistance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· HH group has minimally adequate food consumption but is unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies</li> </ul>	<p>Even with any humanitarian assistance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· HH group has food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition;</li> <li>OR</li> <li>· HH group is marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.</li> </ul>	<p>Even with any humanitarian assistance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· HH group has large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality;</li> <li>OR</li> <li>· HH group has extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to large food consumption gaps in the short term.</li> </ul>	<p>Even with any humanitarian assistance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· HH group has an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, and destitution are evident.</li> </ul>
Priority Response Objectives	Action required to Build Resilience and for Disaster Risk Reduction	Action required for Disaster Risk Reduction and to Protect Livelihoods	Urgent Action Required to: 		
			Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition	Save lives and livelihoods	Prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods

**Diagram 4: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table for Area Classification**

*Purpose: To guide short term strategic objectives linked to medium and long-term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.*

*Usage: Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.*

	Phase 1 Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Famine
Phase Name and Description	<p><i>More than four in five households (HHs) are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance</i></p>	<p><i>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</i></p> <p><i>Minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies.</i></p>	<p><i>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</i></p> <p><i>Food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition</i></p> <p><b>OR</b></p> <p><i>Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.</i></p>	<p><i>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</i></p> <p><i>Large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality</i></p> <p><b>OR</b></p> <p><i>Extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps in the short term.</i></p>	<p><i>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have an extreme lack of food and other basic needs where starvation, death, and destitution are evident.</i></p> <p><i>(Evidence for all three criteria of food consumption, wasting, and CDR is required to classify Famine.)</i></p>
Priority Response Objectives	<p>Action required to Build Resilience and for Disaster Risk Reduction</p>	<p>Action required for Disaster Risk Reduction and to Protect Livelihoods</p>	<p><b>Urgent Action Required to:</b> </p>		
	<p>Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition</p>	<p>Save lives and livelihoods</p>	<p>Prevent widespread mortality and total collapse of livelihoods</p>		

# Desinformation

Erkenntnisse des Famine Review Committee und der Integrated Food Security Phase Classification wurden verkürzt oder verzerrt wiedergegeben

Manipulativer Einsatz von Information, denn zweitschlimmste Stufe 4 (statt Stufe 5 Hungersnot) wurde sehr wohl bestätigt; Stufe 5 für April in Nord-Gaza wurde nicht ausgeschlossen

Reaktionen darauf sagen mehr über die Haltung angesichts schwerster Verbrechen aus als über die Lage vor Ort

*Gaza in April (current) and from May to July (projection). Typically, an FRC review would validate or disprove a Famine (IPC Phase 5) classification. In this case, however, the FRC did not reach a definitive conclusion; rather, the FRC states that FEWS NET's analysis is not plausible **and** that the FRC is unable to determine whether the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds have been met or surpassed due to limited up-to-date, quantifiable evidence. Based on the IPC protocols, FEWS NET cannot provide a definitive classification of Famine (IPC Phase 5) without FRC confirmation of plausibility. Amid the inconclusive nature of the FRC review, FEWS NET reiterates that **uncertainty is inherent to analyzing famine in conflict-affected contexts**, and it is possible Famine was ongoing in northern Gaza in April.*

# Amid uncertainty, it is possible Famine is ongoing in northern Gaza

## Key messages

- Upon review of available [evidence](#) and known information gaps, **FEWS NET finds it is possible, if not likely, that all three IPC thresholds for Famine (food consumption, acute malnutrition, and mortality<sup>1</sup>) were met or surpassed in northern Gaza in April.** FEWS NET also assesses it is possible Famine<sup>2</sup> will persist through at least July if there is not a fundamental change in how food assistance is distributed and accessed after entering Gaza. While the availability of food aid and informal market supplies critically increased in March and April, it is unlikely that over 80 percent of the northern Gaza population averted catastrophic hunger ( $\geq 50$  percent deficit of daily caloric needs). Amid severe hunger, disease, and inadequate nutrition treatment and prevention, it is possible acute malnutrition and mortality levels were above the IPC thresholds in April. While there is an understandable desire for a more definitive determination, the conflict and humanitarian access constraints will likely continue to impede data collection. It is already clear children have died from hunger-related causes, and government decision makers should act urgently to mitigate loss of life regardless of whether the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds are reached or surpassed.
- In **southern Gaza**, FEWS NET assesses Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) area-level outcomes – inclusive of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – were likely ongoing in April; however, the impacts of the Israeli military offensive in Rafah are seriously disrupting food distribution channels and worsening access to food. **bringing the south into**

*In line with protocols for [IPC-compatible](#) analysis, FEWS NET submitted for a plausibility review by the IPC's [Famine Review Committee](#) (FRC) a classification of [Famine \(IPC Phase 5\) with reasonable evidence](#) in northern Gaza in April (current) and from May to July (projection). Typically, an FRC review would [validate or disprove](#) a Famine (IPC Phase 5) classification. In this case, however, the FRC did not reach a definitive conclusion; rather, [the FRC states](#) that FEWS NET's analysis is not plausible **and** that the FRC is unable to determine whether the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds have been met or surpassed due to limited up-to-*

**Table 1: Summary of Nutrition Situation**

Driver*	Baseline	North Gaza	Gaza City	Deir al Balah	Khan Younis	Rafah
Dietary Diversity in children 6-23m	Moderate	Extremely Critical	Insufficient sample	Extremely critical	Extremely critical	Extremely Critical
Dietary diversity in pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW)	No recent data available	Extremely Critical	Insufficient sample	Extremely Critical	Extremely Critical	Extremely Critical
Children reporting one or more diseases	Low	Insufficient sample	Insufficient sample	Extremely Critical	Insufficient sample	Extremely Critical
Acute respiratory infection (ARI) in children under 5 (CU5)	Low	Insufficient sample	Insufficient sample	Critical	Insufficient sample	Critical
Diarrhoea (CU5)	Low	Insufficient sample	Insufficient sample	Extremely Critical	Insufficient sample	Extremely Critical
Other diseases (fever, vomiting, skin infection)	Low	Insufficient sample	Insufficient sample	Extremely Critical	Insufficient Sample	Extremely Critical
Water and sanitation access	Severe	Insufficient sample	Extremely Critical	Extremely Critical	Insufficient sample	Extremely Critical
Acute malnutrition (by anthropometry) in children 6-23m	Low	Critical	Insufficient sample	Insufficient sample	Insufficient sample	Low

Global Nutrition Cluster: Gaza Nutrition Vulnerability and Situation Analysis. February 2024.

<https://www.nutritioncluster.net/sites/nutritioncluster.com/files/2024-02/GAZA-Nutrition-vulnerability-and-SitAn-v7.pdf>

In May, FEWS NET conducted an IPC-Compatible analysis of the food security situation and found that it is possible famine was ongoing in northern Gaza during April.<sup>1</sup> In line with IPC protocols, the FRC reviewed this analysis and concluded that, given the uncertainty and lack of convergence of the supporting evidence employed in the analysis, it was unable to make a determination as to whether or not famine thresholds have been passed during April. Therefore, the FRC was unable to endorse the FEWS NET analysis. The FEWS NET report and the FRC report were both published on 4 June.<sup>2</sup>

**Hungersnot in Nord-Gaza im April 2024  
möglich, aber nicht bestätigbar**

**Unmöglich, Hungersnot verlässlich  
festzustellen**

**Phase 4 aktuell und in Projektion plausibel**

**Risiko von Hungersnot (Phase 5) besteht**

A new analysis was conducted by the multi-agency analysis team between 27 May and 4 June 2024 and the FRC was requested to assess the plausibility of the risk of Famine for the projected period (16 June to 30 September 2024).

The FRC finds the analysis team's classifications in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) for the "current" period (1 May – 15 June) for all areas plausible.

The FRC also considers the analysis team's classification of IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) for the projection period (16 June – 30 September 2024) for all the areas plausible, based on the scenario and assumptions set by the analysis team.

The FRC finds the risk of Famine plausible for all areas, based on the assumptions set by the analysis team. A high risk of Famine persists as long as conflict continues, and humanitarian access is restricted. The FRC also considers that, due to a high level of population movements between the three southern governorates during the current and projection periods, it is appropriate to consider a risk of Famine analysis for the combined areas.

# „Hilfe“ statt Politik

Humanitäre Hilfe per Airdrop (lt. Website des AA bisher 315 Tonnen)

Ineffizientes Spektakel unter Missachtung humanitärer Standards

Unterstützung f. Seekorridor nach 60 Tagen Bauzeit für Pier (230 Mio. US-\$ Kosten), weitgehend dysfunktional, nur etwa 20 Tage im Einsatz (lt. USAID Evaluierung)



Deutschland hilft – auch aus der Luft. Das [@Team\\_Luftwaffe](#) hat heute in Teamarbeit mit [@AuswaertigesAmt](#), [@francediplo](#) & Jordanien Hilfsgüter über dem Norden von [#Gaza](#) abgeworfen. Vier Paletten mit je einer Tonne Lebensmittel, unter anderem mit Reis & Mehl. 1/2



12:58 nachm. · 16. März 2024 · 214.771 Mal angezeigt



Quelle: <https://x.com/AuswaertigesAmt/status/1768970065376915644?s=20>

**Figure 2. JLOTS Temporary Pier on the Gaza Coast (May 16, 2024)**



Source: U.S. Central Command.

**Figure 3. JLOTS Floating Platform (May 16, 2024)**



Source: U.S. Central Command.







## Maritime Route (JLOTS)

\*The floating pier (JLOTS) started operating on the 17th of May.  
\*JLOTS operations are weather-dependent.

Trucks By Date



Donor Nations





# Aid to Flow to Gaza via Land Route From Israel's Port of Ashdod

July 17, 2024 | By [David Vergun](#), DOD News | [f](#) [X](#) [↗](#)

The mission to get humanitarian aid to Gaza via the temporary pier, which the military calls Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS, has ended, the deputy commander of U.S. Central Command told the news media today.

## USAID's Gaza Response: External Factors Impaired Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance Through the JLOTS Maritime Corridor

Multiple factors outside of USAID's control impaired the Agency's efforts to distribute humanitarian assistance delivered through JLOTS within Gaza. DoD and IDF operational and security requirements took precedence in the planning to use JLOTS for the humanitarian response. In addition, issues related to operating in a conflict environment were compounded by weather, security, and humanitarian access challenges that affected how much assistance could enter the region through the maritime corridor and safely reach partner distribution centers in Gaza.<sup>12</sup> As a result of these external factors, JLOTS operated for about 20 of the planned 90 days. It fell short of meeting the U.S. government's goal of providing enough aid to feed 500,000 people per month, or 1.5 million people over 3 months, and instead delivered enough aid to feed 450,000 people for 1 month.

USA u. a. wurden v. a. gehindert durch:

- Schlechtes Wetter
- Israelische „Sicherheitserwägungen“
- Ergebnis: Hilfe für einen Bruchteil der vorgesehenen Bevölkerung

CoGAT-Zahlen der LKW nicht verifizierbar und daher bei UN nicht berücksichtigt

Verhältnis zw. humanitären und sogen. kommerziellen LKW unklar (Förderung einflussreicher Großfamilien in Gaza), ca. zw. 40:60 und 30:70.

Zahl verweigerter Hilfskonvois hat sich von Juli zu August verdoppelt, 53 auf 105.

## US military to dismantle ill-fated Gaza aid pier, declaring 'mission complete'


Although Central Command praises operation, scheme announced by Biden cost \$230m and only operated 25 days




📹 Officials from USAid and the World Food Program visit the port in Ashdod, Israel, on 11 July 2024. Photograph: Léo Corrêa/AP

# Land Route

Trucks By Delivery Route




Trucks Per Crossing Point



November 2023	Dezember 2023	Januar 2024	Februar	
96 LKW (19%/16%)*	109 LKW (21%/18%)	167 LKW (33%/28%)	124 LKW (25%/21%)	
März 2024	April 2024	Mai 2024	Juni 2024	Juli 2024
161 LKW (32%/27%)	220 LKW (44%/37%)	201 LKW (40%/34%)	165 LKW (33%/28%)	191 LKW (38%/32%)

\*Prozentzahl je nach dem, ob man der Berechnung des Erreichungsgrads der Deckung des tägl. Bedarfs Gazas 500 LKW oder 600 LKW zugrunde legt.



August: 146 LKWs pro Tag

November: 77 LKWs pro Tag

September: 141 LKWs pro Tag

Oktober: 58 LKWs pro Tag

# Gaza im Krieg

Hunger als Waffe (HRW, Oxfam)

1 von 6 Kindern in Nord-Gaza  
akut unterernährt (Mai 2024)


95% Haushalte: Begrenzung von  
Mahlzeiten o. Portionsgröße,  
64% nur 1 Mahlzeit pro Tag

95% Familien rationieren Essen  
für Erwachsene, um ihre Kinder  
versorgen zu können



A two-year-old girl getting her middle-upper-arm-circumference (MUAC) measured. Her MUAC reads less than 10, indicating severe acute malnutrition, drastic weight loss, and muscle atrophy. Photo by UNICEF/ Eyad El Baba

Quelle: <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-123>

Informing humanitarians worldwide 24/7 —a service provided by  OCHA

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## Israel's siege now blocks 83% of food aid reaching Gaza, new data reveals

 News and Press Release • Sources: [ActionAid](#), [AFSC](#), [CARE](#), + 11 more • Posted: 16 Sep 2024 • Originally published: 16 Sep 2024 • Origin: [View original](#) 

**Joint press release: 15 aid organisations demand international pressure for an immediate ceasefire, arms embargo, and end to Israel's systematic aid obstruction**

Primary country:

[occupied Palestinian territory](#)

Unterzeichnet u. a. von CARE International, Save the Children, ActionAid, Christian Aid, HelpAge International, Oxfam, DanChurchAid, Norwegian Church Aid, Danish Refugee Council, Norwegian Refugee Council



# Gaza seit Oktober 2024

US-Ultimatum von 13.10.2024  
verstrich ohne Folgen

Plünderung unter Augen der  
Armee auch in israel. Medien

Signifikanter Ausbau israel.  
Infrastruktur in Gaza (Netzarim,  
Philadelphi, Jabalia und vierter,  
bisher nicht näher bezeichneter  
Korridor)

Quelle: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-11-11/ty-article/.premium/the-idf-is-allowing-gaza-gangs-to-loot-aid-trucks-and-extort-protection-fees-from-drivers/00000193-17fb-d50e-a3db-57ff16af0000>

Haaretz | Israel News

## The Israeli Army Is Allowing Gangs in Gaza to Loot Aid Trucks and Extort Protection Fees From Drivers

Armed clans in the Rafah area are blocking trucks entering Gaza from Israel, leading some organizations to avoid sending desperately needed humanitarian aid. These incidents are occurring in an area under full IDF control, with the army refraining from action due to concerns that harm to aid workers could provoke international criticism



# Gaza seit Oktober 2024

## Scores by Measures

Requirement	Grade
Enabling a minimum of 350 trucks per day to enter Gaza, upholding your prior commitment to allow assistance to flow consistently through all four major crossings (Erez West, Erez East, Gate 96, and Kerem Shalom), as well as opening a new fifth crossing.	●
Instituting adequate humanitarian pauses across Gaza as necessary to enable humanitarian activities, including vaccinations, deliveries, and distribution, for at least the next four months.	●
Allowing people in Mawasi and the "humanitarian zone" to move inland before winter.	●
Enhancing security for fixed humanitarian sites and movements.	●
Rescinding evacuation orders when there is no operational need.	●
Facilitating rapid implementation of the World Food Program winter and logistics plan to repair roads, install warehousing, and expand platforms and staging areas.	●
Ensuring Israeli Coordination and Liaison (CLA) officers can communicate with humanitarian convoys at checkpoints and assign division-level liaison officers from Southern Command to the Joint Coordination Board.	●
Removing restrictions on the use of container and closed trucks and increasing the number of vetted drivers to 400.	●
Removing an agreed list of essential items from the dual-use restricted list.	●

# „Korridore“ in Gaza



# Netzarim, 56 km<sup>2</sup> (15% Gazas)



# Netzarim, 56 km<sup>2</sup> (15% Gazas)



# Netzarim, 56 km<sup>2</sup> (15% Gazas)



# Philadelphi Corridor

## Destruction near the border

8 May 2024



# Philadelphi Corridor

22 August 2024



Source: Planet Labs PBC





# Philadelphi Corridor

**Destruction of village along Gaza border**

**Al Qarya as Suwaydiya**



# Philadelphi Corridor

**IDF vehicles at same location**



Source: IDF

**B B C**

# Nord-Gaza

Regelmäßige Angriffe auf  
Zufluchtsorte

Alleine im Oktober 64 Angriffe  
auf Schulen, v. a. in Nord-Gaza  
(insges. 226 Angriffe)

Lt. UNICEF 95% aller Schulen  
beschädigt o. zerstört; mehr als  
600.000 Kinder im Schulalter  
seit über 1 Jahr ohne Unterricht



Aftermath of the airstrike on Rufaida school in Deir Al Balah, Gaza, on 10 October 2024. The school had been turned into an IDP shelter, and was also hosting a malnutrition treatment point, where parents and children were queuing when the airstrike hit, killing many. Two health staff of a UNICEF partner were also killed.

Quelle für Text und Bild: <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/regular-attacks-put-gaza-schools-turned-shelters-frontlines-war>

# Nord-Gaza

Klare Anzeichen für das Ziel der völkerrechtswidrigen Zwangs-umsiedlung mindestens der Bevölkerung Nord-Gazas

Ethnische Säuberung durch Angriffe und Androhung von Gewalt, Aushungern der Bevölkerung und Verhinderung Ihrer Rückkehr

Zeitgleich Entwicklung von Szenarien zur Wiederbesiedlung

Quelle:

☰ **CNN World** Africa Americas Asia Australia China Europe India More ▾

World / Middle East

## Former defense minister accuses Israel of ethnic cleansing in northern Gaza

By Mick Krever and Dana Karni, CNN  
🕒 5 minute read · Updated 11:55 AM EST, Mon December 2, 2024

Facebook X Email Link



# Nord-Gaza



Quelle: Landau, Idan: Exterminate, expel, resettle: Israel's endgame in northern Gaza. In:

[https://www.972mag.com/extermi-nate-expel-resettle-israel-northern-gaza/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMT EAAR2vPwtP0eRIdSFjDMQFGKrSh1 LMXUqp65IGVH0ImFE4Fh1RuOVNI y0JYSw\\_aem\\_- 5jXHeVUaHdptTeA4ea6w](https://www.972mag.com/extermi-nate-expel-resettle-israel-northern-gaza/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMT EAAR2vPwtP0eRIdSFjDMQFGKrSh1 LMXUqp65IGVH0ImFE4Fh1RuOVNI y0JYSw_aem_- 5jXHeVUaHdptTeA4ea6w)

Left: Israeli settlers gather at an event celebrating Sukkot near the Gaza Strip, calling for annexation and resettlement, October 21, 2024. (Oren Ziv) Right: Displaced Palestinians line up at gunpoint in the ruins of Jabalia refugee camp. (Used in accordance with Clause 27a of the Copyright Law)

# IGH: Südafrika gg. Israel

29.12.2023 Bekanntgabe der südafrikanischen Initiative

11./12.01.2024 Anhörungen

26.01. Vorläufige Maßnahmen 1

28.03. Vorläufige Maßnahmen 2

24.05. Vorläufige Maßnahmen 3



Quelle: <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192>

Gaza. Photo: Mohammed Zaanoun, active stills

# IGH: Südafrika gg. Israel

Wichtigste Anordnungen: Unterlassung genozidaler Akte, hum. Hilfe zulassen und Grundversorgung sicherstellen, Anstachelung zu genozid. Akten verbieten und verfolgen, Stop der Offensive gg. Rafah (aber mit Einschränkungen\*)

Plädoyer Südafrika: 28.10.2024

Verteidigung Israels: 28.07.2025



Friedenspalast in Den Haag. Sitz des Internationalen Gerichtshofs.

Quelle: dierk schaefer, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

\* "Israel must immediately halt its military offensive, and any other action in the Rafah Governorate, which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."

# IGH: Südafrika gg. Israel


Feststellungen: Situation hat sich trotz der Anordnungen verschlechtert

Grund zur Annahme, dass ohne vorläufige Maßnahmen Rechte irreversibel verletzt werden

Ein ordentliches Verfahren ist eröffnet worden (s. o.)







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